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Approach
The enforcement of foreign country judgments and arbitral awards is an
integral part of today's international business. "It should be clear today," wrote
Homburger a few years ago, "that recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments are far more than attractive subjects for academic exercises; they have
become bread and butter problems for the legal profession which increasingly
encounters them on the interstate and international levels."' The recently revised
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 2 reflects this fact.
Chapter Eight of the new Restatement sets forth some of the prevailing common
and statutory law principles concerning the recognition and enforcement of
foreign country judgments and foreign arbitral awards in the United States.3 The
*J.D. (Referendar), 1977, S.J.D. (Doktor der Rechte), 1981, Habilitation, 1987, University of
Mfinster School of Law; LL.M., 1978, University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall);
Professor of Law, Business and Tax Law Chair, University of Konstanz School of Law. Judge,
District Court, Konstanz. Member, New York Bar. Associate Editor-in-Chief, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER. Co-editor-in-Chief, ZEITSCHRIF" FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT.

**A.B., 1980, Occidental College; M.B.A., 1985, Clarmont Graduate School; J.D., 1989,
Southern Methodist University School of Law.
I.

Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: A New Yorker Reflects on

Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 367, 368 (1970).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. When the project of the new Restatement began, its working title was "Restatement

of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)," reflecting the fact that it was the direct
successor to the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States published by the
American Law Institute in 1965. The designation of the new work as "Restatement (Third)" signifies

that it is in the generation of Restatements forthcoming since the Restatement (Second). See
RESTATEMENT at IX.
3. See RESTATEMENT supra note 2, at 591-92.
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Introductory Note to Chapter Eight 4 and some of the Reporters' Notes 5 also take
account of legal sources and developments outside the United States.
While the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law would seem to be an
appropriate place to set forth provisions relating to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign countries' judgments and arbitral awards, 6 the Restatement did not contain provisions relating to this important topic until the recent
revisions. 7 In essence, the previous Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States did not deal with the subject; it merely stated the generally
accepted principle that refusal by one state to give effect to judgments of another
because of lack of reciprocity does not violate international law.8 Prior to the
recent revisions of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law, only the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) and its 1986 Revisions
addressed the enforcement questions in some detail. 9 The Restatement (Second)
of Judgments, by contrast, does not deal with judgments rendered by courts of
foreign countries. The principles applicable to interstate recognition and enforcement of judgments, however, may be applicable to the international recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments as well.
This article explores the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
and arbitral awards provisions of the revised Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law in light of existing common and statutory law in the United States.
Consequently, the enforcement of American judgments and arbitral awards
outside the United States is beyond the scope of this essay.'° While the new

RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 481-488; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 460.
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supranote 2, § 481 reporters' notes 6 & 7; RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 487 reporters' note 2; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488 reporters' note 2 at 640-641.
4.

6. In the United States, law of recognition and enforcement of foreign-country judgments is
primarily domestic law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations of this country as
well as other substantial international consequences. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § I(b).
7. As Restatements are informal sources of law, their relevance, impact, use, and
persuasiveness in the United States and abroad depend upon the consensus they reflect. See
Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1987, at 47. See generally K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW

259-60 (2d ed. 1987).
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 9 Comment a (1962).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT]. For details of the enforcement of foreign judgment provisions of the Restatement (Second)
8.

of Conflict of Laws, see Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220 (1972).
10. For a detailed country-by-country analysis of the recognition and enforceability of American
judgments outside the United States, see, e.g., ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS ABROAD (P. Weems
ed. 1988); see also G. DELAUME, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 199-222 (1988);

G. ROMAN, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN VARIOUS FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(1984); Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About
It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236 (1957); Sandrock & Hentzen, Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
FederalRepublic of Germany: The Example of a United States Award, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 49 (1989);
Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, the
United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 299
VOL. 24, NO. I
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Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law deals with foreign money-judgments
as well as non-money-judgments, the focus of this article is upon foreign country
judgments granting or denying recovery of a sum of money. The enforcement of
specific performance,13
judgments other than money-judgments, such as orders for
2
injunctions, divorce decrees," child custody orders,' and support orders,

(1983). For an historical account, see Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad,

29

L.J. 188 (1919).
11. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 484, which reads:

YALE

(1) Courts in the United States will recognize a divorce granted in the State in
which both parties to the marriage had their domicile or their habitual residence at the
time of divorce, and valid and effective under the law of that State.
(2) Courts in the United States may, but need not, recognize a divorce, valid and
effective under the law of the State where it was granted,
(a) if that State was, at the time of divorce, the State of domicile or habitual
residence of one party to the marriage; or
(b) if the divorce was granted by a court having jurisdiction over both parties,
and if at least one party appeared in person and the other party had notice
of an opportunity to participate in the proceeding.
(3) A court that would not recognize a divorce that is within Subsection 2(a) or
2(b) may nevertheless recognize such a divorce if it would be recognized by the State
where the parties were domiciled or had their habitual residence at the time of the
divorce.
For details, see Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative
Study, 65 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1951); Note, United States Recognition of Foreign Nonjudicial
Divorces, 53 MINN. L. REV. 612 (1969).
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 485, which reads:
(1) A court in the United States will recognize an order of a foreign court
awarding or modifying an award of custody of a child, valid and effective in the State
where it was issued, if, when the proceeding was commenced,
(a) the issuing State was the habitual residence of the child;
(b) the child and at least one party to the custody proceeding has a significant
connection with that State; or
(c) the child was present in that State and emergency conditions required a
custody order for protection of the child;
provided that notice of the proceeding was given to each parent and to any other
person having physical custody of the child.
(2) Ordinarily, a court in the United States may modify a custody order entitled
to recognition under this section only if the rendering court no longer has jurisdiction
to modify the order, or had declined to exercise its jurisdiction to modify it.
See also UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1968); FEDERAL PARENTAL
KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT OF1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). For details of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign custody decrees, see, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody Decrees
Rendered Abroad, 2 AM. J. COMp. L. 167 (1953).
13. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 486 which reads:
(1) A court in the United States will recognize and enforce an order of a foreign
court for support, valid and effective under the law of the State where it was issued,
if the issuing State
(a) was the domicile of habitual residence of both parties to the marriage when
the obligation for support accrued;
(b) was the domicile or habitual residence of the support debtor at the time the
order was issued; or
(c) was the domicile or habitual residence of the support creditor, and the
support debtor appeared in the proceedings.
SPRING 1990
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properly merits separate analyses. Additionally, the enforcement of foreign
public law judgments, such as tax and penal judgments, 14 is not examined in this
paper. Finally, the enforcement of international bankruptcy judgments' 5 is also
excluded despite its growing significance in practice.
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
carefully distinguishes between the enforcement of judgments and the enforcement of arbitral awards. This distinction flows from the fact that enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards is a matter of international obligation and in the United
States is governed by federal law, whereas enforcement of foreign judgments is
a matter of state law. In view of the diversity in the law and practice of the fifty
states, the drafters of the Restatement faced a particularly difficult task in
restating the law in this area. Yet, to anticipate the conclusion drawn by this
article, the drafters have succeeded in providing a succinct restatement of the
principles of the law of recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments as well as foreign arbitral awards. Given the great number of foreign
country money-judgments that are sought to be enforced in this country, the first
part of this article inquires into the Restatement provisions relating to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign money-judgments. The second part of
this article analyzes the Restatement provisions relating to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
I.

Foreign Country Money-Judgments

The recognition and enforcement of foreign country money-judgments in the
United States is complicated by the absence of federal law on this subject.
Although through a multilateral or bilateral treaty the United States could
preempt the area of recognition and enforcement of foreign money-judgments,
(2) A court in the United States may modify a support order entitled to recognition
under Subsection (1), at the initiative of either party in accordance with § 421(2)(b), (c),
or (g).
See also REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 98 U.L.A. 381 (1968); Cavers,
InternationalEnforcement of Family Support, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 994 (1981).
14. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 483, which reads: "Courts in the United States are not
required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered
by the court of other States." Under the "revenue rule," American courts will normally not enforce
the tax or criminal laws of a foreign nation. See R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOGLE,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 347 n.2 (1986).

For a

discussion of the origin of and the rationale for the "revenue rule," see RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,
§ 483 reporters' notes 1 & 2. See also Note, The Nonrecognition of Foreign Tax Judgments:
InternationalTax Evasion, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (author argues that nonrecognition of foreign tax
judgments encourages tax evasion).
15. For details of the recognition of foreign bankruptcies in the United States, see, e.g., James,
InternationalBankruptcy: Limited Recognition in the New U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 3 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 241 (1981); Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAW. 1153
(1985).

VOL. 24, NO. I

FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY-JUDGMENTS

25

no such treaty has been established. 16 Because of the absence of an international
treaty 17 and a federal statute, 18 the recognition and enforcement of foreign
country money-judgments in the United States is essentially regulated by state
law. 19 State action in this area is, of course, subject to the limitations imposed by
the United States Constitution and international law.
In most states of the Union, the law on recognition and enforcement of
foreign country money-judgments is not codified. Much of the development of
the law of enforcement of foreign judgments has evolved through decisions of
state or federal courts applying state law; thus it is not surprising that the law
varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Attempts to harmonize the
existing body of law in this field have been relatively unsuccessful. Although
the Restatement closely parallels much of the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act of 1962,20 only a minority of state jurisdictions in
the United States have adopted the Uniform Act. 2 1 Additionally, many of the
16. R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOGLE, supra note 14, at 371. See also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 2, ch. 8, introductory note, at 592, acknowledging that the United States has not been a party
to any bilateral or multilateral treaty regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
although numerous other countries, including the Member States of the European Community, have.
17. For a discussion of the negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom on
a proposed Convention Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters, see E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 971-72 (1982); Smit, The Proposed United
States-UnitedKingdom Convention On Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments: A Prototypefor
the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977). See generally Nadelmann, The United States ofAmerica
and Agreements on Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 1 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 156
(1953).
18. Some commentators argue that a body of federal common law concerning the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments could be developed on the basis of a "dormant foreign
commerce clause." See, e.g., Comment, Judgments RenderedAbroad-State Law or Federal Law?,
12 VILL. L. REV. 618 (1967); Note, Alternative Theories for Establishing a Federal Common Law of
Foreign Judgments in Commercial Cases: The Foreign Affairs Power and the Dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 635 (1976).
19. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
20. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962) [hereinafter-

UNIFORM ACT]. The Uniform Act has been held not to be preempted by federal law. See 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (1989), implementing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention]. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). The court held the federal statutes only applied to
arbitration awards, not foreign money-judgments or enforcement of foreign judgments confirming
foreign arbitral awards. See also Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d
Cir. 1987).
21. Jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Act include: Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, at 19
(1989 Supp.). In view of the practical significance of the Uniform Act in these jurisdictions, it is
surprising that, as far as the authors know, there is no comprehensive study of the Uniform Foreign

Money-Judgments Recognition Act in English. For a thorough analysis in German, see F. WEINSCHENK, DIE ANERKENNUNG UND VOLLSTRECKUNG BUNDESDEUTSCHER URTEILE IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN

SPRING 1990
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states that have adopted the Uniform Act have done so with considerable
variations and amendments. 22
Recognizing the lack of international treaties and federal law and the need for
uniformity in this area of the law, the new Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law incorporates provisions relating to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign country judgments. Section 481 (1) of the Restatement states the general
principle that a final judgment of a court of a foreign country is entitled to
recognition in courts in the United States. Section 481(2) emphasizes the basic
principle that a judgment entitled to recognition may be enforced in the United
States in accordance with the procedure for enforcement of judgments applicable
in the state where enforcement is sought. 23 Section 482 of the Restatement
qualifies the general principles laid down in section 481 by enunciating a number
of situations in which courts in the United States may not, or need not, recognize
a foreign country judgment. 24

UNTER DEN

"FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENT RECOGNITION ACTS"

(1988) (dealing primarily with

the recognition and enforcement of German judgments in the United States, especially in New York).
22. See, e.g., UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, variations from official text at 263-64, 269-70,
272-73. Many deviations from the official text of the Uniform Act are semantic only. Some
alterations, however, are significant. For instance, changes made by New York in regards to the
Uniform Act § 4, are equivalent to the Restatement § 482 tests. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, at 268.
For details of the New York law, see F. WEINSCHENK, supra note 21, at 96-147. Additionally,
Maryland has made fraud a mandatory ground for the denial of a foreign country money-judgment.
See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, at 269.
23. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481, which reads:
(1) Except as provided in § 482, a final judgment of a court of a foreign State
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or confirming the status
of a person, or determining interests in property, is conclusive between the parties,
and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States.
(2) A judgment entitled to recognition under Subsection (I) may be enforced by
any party or its successor or assigns against any other party, its successors or assigns,
in accordance with the procedure for enforcement of judgments applicable where
enforcement is sought.
24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482, which reads:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the court of a
foreign State if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the
defendant in accordance with the law of the rendering state and with the
rules set forth in Section 421.
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a
foreign State if:
(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to
enable him to defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment
itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State
where recognition is sought;
VOL. 24, NO. I
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In contrast to the Uniform Act,2 5 sections 481 and 482 of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States are not limited to
judgments granting or denying recovery of a sum of money. 26 Section 7 of the
Uniform Act makes it clear, however, that the Act does not prevent recognition
of judgments other than money-judgments. 27 Like sections 484 to 486 of the
Restatement, section 7 of the Uniform Act reflects the practice of American
courts to recognize and enforce foreign country non-money-judgments, such as
judgments of divorce, custody, adoption, and other incidents of family status,
provided, of course, that certain conditions are met.28 In view of this practice,
it should be appreciated that the drafters went beyond the Uniform Act when they
included the current state of the law with respect to the recognition and
enforcement of non-money-judgments.
A.

RECOGNITION

Section 481 of the Restatement properly distinguishes between the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. The principle of recognition is primarily
founded upon the policy that there is no need to relitigate an issue already
adequately determined by a foreign court. 29 The importance of recognition,
however, goes well beyond a successful litigant's attempt to enforce a foreign
country money-judgment in the United States. Recognition may also be relevant
when a litigating party seeks to defend its cause on the basis of prior adjudication
of the controversy (res judicata),3 ° or a prior determination of a fact or law issue

(e)

the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to
recognition; or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between
the parties to submit the controversy on which the judgment is based to
another forum.
25. SEEUNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, § 1(2), which states: " '[F]oreign judgment' means any
judgment of a foreign State granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment
for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters."
26. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 484-486.
27. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, § 7.

28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 reporters' note 2.
29. See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1601, 1602-05 (1968), indicating that the policy behind
ending litigation includes both prudential and fairness factors such as: (1) not harassing the successful
litigant; (2) limiting the availability of plaintiff's choice of forum; (3) fostering stability and unity in
international relations; and to a certain extent, (4) fostering the belief that the rendering forum is more
appropriate than the recognizing forum, for reasons like convenience in deciding the merits of a suit.
See also Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 905 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
30. See generally F. WEINSCHENK, supra note 21, at 105-11; Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign
Country Judgments, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 291 (1963); Peterson, supra note 9, at 259-64; Reese, The
Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950); Smit,
International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44
(1962); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MicH. L. REV.
1129 (1935).
SPRING 1990
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(collateral estoppel and claim preclusion). 3 1 Additionally, the issue of recognition may become relevant in proceedings before institutions other than courts,
such as administrative agencies or arbitration tribunals. 32
1. Comity
In the final analysis, the willingness of one country to recognize another
country's money-judgments rests upon the paramount yet often elusive concept
of comity. 33 Comity is generally analogized to and described as the international
equivalent of the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution as
applied to the sister states. 34 Unfortunately, courts continue to have difficulty in
distinguishing between these two distinct, albeit functionally similar, legal
bases.35 The full faith and credit clause applies only to the recognition of
judgments as between the sister states of the United States; it does not legally
bind U.S. courts to recognize judgments rendered outside the United States. In
contrast, comity applies only to the recognition of judgments rendered outside
the United States. Most importantly, comity has been established merely as a rule
37
36
of practice, convenience, and expediency; it is not a rule of law.
Comity stands for the proposition that, as a general rule, foreign country
judgments are as much entitled to recognition in the United States as judgments
between the sister states. The United States Supreme Court recognized comity in
the landmark case of Hilton v. Guyot. 38 The Supreme Court stated that comity is
31. See F. WEINSCHENK, supra note 21, at 115-20; Smit, supra note 30; Reese, supra note 30. For
the relevance of "collateral estoppel" in recognition and enforcement cases, see Carl Zeiss Stiftung
v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971). See also Johnston v. Compagnie Gdn6rale Transatlantique,
242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926) (concerning claim preclusion effect).
32. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 reporters' note 5 (citing Regierungspraesident Land
Nordrhein Westfalen v. Rosenthal, 17 A.D.2d 145, 232 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1962) in which the decision
of a West German administrative agency revoking an award of restitution to victims of the Nazi
regime on grounds of misrepresentation was recognized in New York, and the agency was permitted
to recover funds previously awarded).
33. See Juenger, The Recognition ofMoney Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 1, 7-8 (1988).

34. Note Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments-A Casefor Federalization, 22 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 331, 334-35 (1987); see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 29, at 1607.
35. See Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 16 Ir'L LAW. 425, 426-27 (1982) (citing a case in which a United States court awarded
a Costa Rican judgment both full faith and credit and comity); see also Note, The Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act: A Survey of the Case Law, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 171,

177-78 (1981) (citing situations wherein purely domestic cases in the United States courts incorrectly
attempted to treat a sister state judgment as a foreign country judgment under the Uniform Act).
36. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Johnston v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381,
152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926).
37. See Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440.
38. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. 3 9
Both the Restatement and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act are grounded upon the basic notions of comity.
Comity is, of course, subject to a number of constraints. One of the primary
limitations that continues to be acknowledged by some courts in the United
States is that of reciprocity. In Hilton v. Guyot the Supreme Court concluded that
comity called for enforcement of foreign judgments only on the basis of
reciprocity. 40 While the holding in Hilton has not been formally overruled,
modem case law suggests that reciprocity has lost much of its vitality in the
United States, 4 1 and the extent to which reciprocity is still a prerequisite for
recognition is uncertain. 42 The Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act
does not make reciprocity a precondition for recognition and enforcement of
foreign-country judgments. 43 The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
questions whether considerations of reciprocity are material.4a
The drafters of the new Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law recognize
that the great majority of courts in the United States have rejected the
requirement of reciprocity, both in construing the Uniform Act and apart from
the Act. 45 As a result, reciprocity is not expressly required under the
46
Restatement, even though reciprocity continues to lurk between the lines of the
recognition and enforcement provisions of the Restatement, its comments, and
reporters' notes. In light of the modem case law and the Restatement, reciprocity

39. Id. at 163-64.
40. Id. at 228; see also Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895).
41. See Juenger, supranote 33, at 33; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 29, at 1660-62; Note,
Denying Enforcement of a Foreign Country Injunction-Solution or Symptom: Pilkington Bros. v.
AFG Industries, Inc.?, 17 CONN. L. REV. 703, 706-08 (1985).
42. Reciprocity requirements are effectuated in numerous forms of extraterritorial assertions of
jurisdiction including, but not limited to: economic sanctions, competition laws and regulations,
export controls, national security policies, and law enforcement. Some of these assertions are made
through a legislative process and are expressed statutorily, while others are not. See generally Small,
Managing ExtraterritorialJurisdictionProblems: The United States Government Approach, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 283.
43. See R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOOLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 451 (3d ed. 1988).

44.
45.

supra note 9, § 98 comment e.
2, § 481 reporters' note 1 (with a list of cases); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 comment d.
46. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 reporters' note I quotes from an influential article by
Professor Reese who suggests that "the creditor is not to blame for the fact that the State of rendition
does not accord conclusive effect to American judgments..." Reese, The Status in This Country
of Judgments RenderedAbroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 793 (1950).
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT,
RESTATEMENT, supra note
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may be viewed more in terms47of being a desirable long-term objective than as a
precondition for recognition.
2. Judgments Entitled to Recognition
Section 481 of the Restatement requires that in order for a foreign country
money-judgment to be recognized and subsequently enforced, the judgment must
be final, conclusive between the parties, and not fall within an exception for
nonrecognition under section 482.48 Comment e to section 481 defines a final
judgment as "one that is not subject to additional proceedings in the rendering
court other than execution." 49 The comment continues by stating that the fact
that a judgment is subject to appeal or modification "in light of changed
circumstances" does not deprive the judgment of its finality. 50 This statement,
which will come as a surprise to most Continental lawyers, is, however, less
far-reaching than it may appear.5 ' In practice, recognition and enforcement
actions in the United States typically will be stayed until the final termination of
the appeal in the country that rendered the judgment. 5 2 The same holds true in
cases in which a party satisfies the court that it is entitled to and intends to appeal
the foreign country money-judgment. 53 The Uniform Act coincides with these
54
limitations.
Neither the Restatement nor the Uniform Act differentiates between the
recognition of a default judgment and the recognition of a contested judgment.
This approach does not necessarily mean, however, that courts will generally
give the same direct effect to default judgments as to judgments following
proceedings in which all parties participated. Some states will probably decline
to recognize or enforce foreign judgments rendered after default. 55 In any case,

47. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 29, at 1661 (arguing that "[al reciprocity
requirement may on occasion be justified as a way of bringing pressure upon systems that, in their
recognition practice, drastically limit the effects of foreign judgments.") Accord Carl, Recognition of
Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations-and Vice Versa, 13 Hous. L. REv. 680, 685-86
(1976).
48. See RESTArEMENT, supra note 2, § 481(1).
49. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 comment e, at 596.
50. Id.
51. For a detailed discussion of the different views of American and Continental lawyers as to
the meaning of a final judgment, see F. WENSCHENK, supra note 21, at 103-04.
52. See, e.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 906 (N.D.Tex.
1980); see also F. WEINSCHENK, supra note 21, at 104-05.
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 comment e ("[B]ut courts in which enforcement is
sought in these circumstances often stay their proceedings until the appeal has run its course.")
54. See UNIFORM AcT, supra note 20, §§ 2 & 6, at 264 & 274. UNIFORM ACr, supra note 20, § 6
states:
If the defendant satisfies the court either that an appeal is pending or that he is entitled
and intends to appeal from the foreign judgment, the court may stay the proceedings
until the appeal has been determined or until the expiration of a period of time
sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute the appeal.
55. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment c.
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courts will normally scrutinize very carefully the jurisdiction of the court
rendering the judgment after default. If the rendering court lacked jurisdiction
over the default-judgment debtor, the judgment is not entitled to recognition. 56 If
the judgment debtor appeared in the rendering court for the purpose of
challenging its jurisdiction and that jurisdiction was upheld, this judgment debtor
is generally precluded from renewing the challenge in the recognizing state
unless the proceeding in the rendering court was manifestly unfair to the
judgment debtor or the asserted basis
for jurisdiction is clearly untenable in light
57
of section 421 of the Restatement.
Section 482(2)(f) of the Restatement deals with judgments inconsistent with
the parties' contractual choice of forum and may also be used by a court as a
ground, for nonrecognition of a default judgment.58 Additionally, public policy
59
may operate to deny recognition of a default judgment in the United States.
60
Ackermann v. Levine stands for the proposition, however, that courts in the
United States should be cautious in utilizing the "unruly horse" (Cardozo) of
public policy in the default-judgment context. Whether other U.S. courts will
follow the good example set by the Second Circuit in Ackermann remains to be
seen.
3. Grounds for Nonrecognition: Some General Observations

The main issue in recognition cases is whether grounds for nonrecognition
62
61
exist. Section 482 of the Restatement and section 4 of the Uniform Act

56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(l)(b).
57. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 481 comment i.; see also Hunt v. BP Exploration Co.
(Libya), Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
58. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment h.
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(d); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(b).
60. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
61. For the text of § 482, see supra note 24.
62. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 20, § 4:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of
the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this State;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was
a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
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attempt to clarify this limitation by distinguishing between mandatory and
discretionary grounds for nonrecognition. The Restatement lists two mandatory
conditions for nonrecognition: (1) the rendering foreign forum lacks fair
procedures and (2) the rendering state lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 63 It also states six grounds upon which a court in the United States
need not recognize a foreign judgment: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2)
insufficient notice was given to the defendant; (3) the judgment was obtained by
fraud; (4) the cause of action or resulting judgment is repugnant to the public
policy of the United States or the recognizing state; (5) the judgment conflicts
with prior judgments entitled to recognition; or (6) the judgment process was
contrary to the litigants' contractual choice of forum. 64 The Restatement
resembles the Uniform Act in this respect. They have, however, two important
differences: (1) under the Uniform Act, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a
mandatory ground for nonrecognition; 65 (2) an additional discretionary factor of
forum non conveniens is incorporated into
the Uniform Act if jurisdiction is
66
service.
personal
on
exclusively
founded
The differences between the Restatement and the Uniform Act merit
consideration. 67 The fact that subject matter jurisdiction is a discretionary factor
for nonrecognition under the more recent Restatement, while a binding ground for
the recognizing court under the earlier Uniform Act, is of relatively little significance. Comments a and d of section 482 of the Restatement state that subject
matter jurisdiction of the rendering court is "normally" presumed, 68 except in
cases where the subject matter of the action in the foreign court affects rights in
the United States regarding land or intellectual property (i.e., patents, trademarks,
or copyrights). 69 Therefore, comment d concludes that subject matter jurisdiction

63. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(l)(a)-(b).
64. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 482(2)(a)-(f).

65. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, § 4(a)(3). The New York version of the Uniform Act, by
contrast, treats the lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a discretionary ground for nonrecognition.
See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, at 269.
66. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, § 4(b)(6).
67.

GROUNDS FOR NONRECOGNITION

Mandatory Denial of Recognition
Lack of Fair Procedures:
I. Lack of Impartial Tribunals or
2. Procedures Incompatible with Due Process
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (only under the Uniform
Act)

Discretionary Denial of Recognition
• Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (only under the
Restatement)
• Insufficient Notice
• Judgment Obtained by Fraud
• Cause of Action or Judgment Repugnant to Public Policy of
the recognizing state (under both the Uniform Act and the
Restatement) or of the United States (only under the
Restatement)
Conflicting Judgments Entitled to Recognition
Contrary to Parties' Contractual Choice of Forum
Inconvenient Foreign Forum (only under the Uniform Act)

68. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment a, at 605 and comment d, at 607.
69. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment d, at 607.
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of a foreign court is rarely subject to challenge in the recognizing court, especially
if the issue was or could have been contested in the rendering court.7 °
At first glance the lack of an express forum non conveniens ground for
nonrecognition in the Restatement seems to be more problematic. Comment c to
section 482 of the Restatement refers to both section 5(a)(1) of the Uniform Act
and section 421 of the Restatement, which lists the jurisdictional bases needed to
adjudicate. Comment e to section 421 of the Restatement acknowledges that a
"transitory" or "tag" presence is not generally acceptable under international
law. 72 A possible inference from this comment is that under the Restatement
forum non conveniens factor are automatically incorporated into the fairness test
of personal jurisdiction. 73 This explanation seems, however, somewhat superficial given the rather uncertain status of personal jurisdiction guidelines necessary
to satisfy constitutional due process requirements in the United States. The better
view treats the Restatement in this respect as essentially equivalent to the
Uniform Act, where forum non conveniens is an escape hatch to be used only
where personal jurisdiction is established solely by means of personal service.
Serious consideration of forum non conveniens as an established ground of
nonrecognition in the future would be beneficial. For a relatively small price, this
deliberation would help to attain predictability and uniformity, desirable objec-

70. See id.
supra note 2, § 482 comment c states:
In addition, Section 5(a)(1) of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act lists personal
service in the foreign State as an acceptable basis for jurisdiction, subject, however,
to the reservation that a judgment rendered on this basis need not be recognized if the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum. Compare § 421 comment e.
72. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 421 comment e. Domestically "tag" jurisdiction still
seems acceptable. Thus, for example, under New York law "personal delivery of the summons to the
defendant within the state, no matter how transient his presence, will still give personal jurisdiction
of him ..
" See D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ONNEW YORK PRACTICE 61 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, (1987), rev'g 39 Cal. 3d
35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985), where, in a plurality opinion, the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that the international character of the defendant affects the four-prong
test of fairness and substantial justice, which is derived from the second part of the InternationalShoe
test. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Justice O'Connor
stated convincingly: "The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm
of personal jurisdiction over national borders." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. Unfortunately, because Asahi
is a plurality opinion, and entails different levels of analyses, workable guidelines concerning
jurisdiction over an alien defendant have not materialized. For a blurring of the traditional treatment
of the forum non conveniens factor as solely a venue-oriented prudential concern, and one which is
incorporated into personal jurisdiction as a fairness factor, see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985). Under Burger King, the following factors are to be considered: (1) the burden on
the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most convenient and effective relief; (5) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and (6) the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, (1980)).
71.

RESTATEMENT,
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tives in international relations. 74 Additionally, giving credence to the forum non
conveniens doctrine would help properly to relate the forum, the litigants, and
the nature of the action, which in turn could facilitate resolving peripheral
problems in this area, such as those encountered by a defendant who is a
components part manufacturer. A reasonable use of the forum non conveniens
factor in recognition and enforcement cases would also give courts a certain
amount of flexibility in solving extremely difficult issues of a political nature.76
4. Mandatory Groundsfor Nonrecognition
Although the nonrecognition factors set forth in section 482 of the Restatement are discrete rather than cumulative, most recognizing courts tend to deny
recognition on the basis of more than one ground. This common practice
probably arose because courts seem comfortable with multiple legal support of
their decisions, especially in light of the fact that the contours of the nonrecognition factors stated in section 482 of the Restatement are somewhat blurred. The
multiple justification of nonrecognition determinations makes decisions of the
courts in the forum in which recognition is sought less vulnerable in that they
cannot easily be considered "result driven." Consequently, in a given action, it
is not unusual for a court to find various nonrecognition grounds to be applicable.
Case law is enlightening in attempting to discern both the meaning and scope of
the two compulsory nonrecognition factors of section 482 of the Restatement.
a.

Lack of Fair Procedures
As previously mentioned, section 482(1) of the Restatement lists two
mandatory grounds for the nonrecognition of a foreign judgment in the United
States. Under section 482(l)(a) of the Restatement, a court in the United States
may not recognize a judgment rendered abroad, unless it has satisfied itself of the
essential fairness of the judicial system that rendered the judgment. The lack of

74. See generally Degnan & Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of
Judgments against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1988); Levitt, The Extraterritorial
Assertion of Long-Arm Jurisdictionand the Impact on the InternationalCommercial Community: A
Comment and Suggested Approach, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 713 (1986).

75. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), where a forum non conveniens
determination considered such factors as the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the
availability of compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses, the availability of an alternative
forum, the costs of obtaining willing witnesses, and the burden on the court system. See von Mebren,
TransnationalLitigation in American Courts: An Overview of Problems and Issues, 3 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 43 (1985), stating that two factors weigh heavily in favor of forum retaining a case: (1) the plaintiff
has chosen the forum and consequently, unless abusive, the plaintiff's choice should not be lightly
overridden, and (2) a suit will not be dismissed if it cannot be brought elsewhere. Id. at 45-46.
Obviously, an appropriate forum non conveniens analysis that is used to test the sufficiency of
personal jurisdiction contacts or as an independent venue factor should not be taken lightly.
76. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 467
N.E.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
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impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law justifies the
conclusion that the judicial system of the rendering country lacks the necessary
fairness. The Restatement emphasizes that a court may make this determination
without formal proof or argument on the basis of general knowledge and judicial
notice. Conclusions may be drawn from the facts of the particular
case, the
78
circumstances, and the working of the legal system in question.
Devising a test of whether the foreign judicial proceedings meet U.S. criteria
of fairness thrusts a court into a difficult and complex task. Much must be known
about the rendering country's legal system and its legal processes. Consequently,
it is hardly surprising that U.S. courts traditionally have been reluctant to pass
upon the issue of fairness and have opted instead for easier tests, such as public
policy. Foreign judgments rarely have been denied recognition for want of fair
procedures, and given the development towards a truly international economy,
the chances that this ground will be utilized by U.S. courts in the future seem
even more remote. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VE.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena7 9 is one of the
few cases in which the lack of fair procedures was used as a ground for
nonrecognition. In this case, Judge Mansfield denied recognition because he was
convinced that the East German courts were incapable of functioning as an
independent or civilized judiciary, as they "orient their judgments according to
the wishes of the leaders of the socialist state." 80 One commentator suggests that
this ground could have been conversely used by United States courts confronted
81
with judgments obtained in Iran against United States companies.
b.

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The second ground for the mandatory nonrecognition of a foreign judgment in
the United States applies when the rendering court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with the laws of the rendering state
and in accordance with the requisite constitutional due process requirements.82
The lack of jurisdiction over the defendant is undoubtedly the most common of
the mandatory grounds for refusal to recognize or enforce a judgment rendered
by a court outside the United States. A court that did not have jurisdiction over
the defendant under the laws of its own state cannot expect the courts of other
countries to recognize or enforce such a judgment. Even if the rendering court
had jurisdiction over the defendant under the laws of its own country, a court in
the United States applying the Restatement test will not automatically recognize

77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment b.

78. For details, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment b.
79. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified,
433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
80. Id., 293 F. Supp. at 906-07.
81. See Newman, Enforcement of Judgments, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 77, 86-88 (1984).
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(l)(b).

SPRING 1990

36

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

the foreign judgment. Section 482(1)(b) of the Restatement requires that the
court scrutinize the basis for the asserted 83
jurisdiction in light of the principles set
forth in section 421 of the Restatement.
Section 421 of the Restatement establishes the bases upon which personal
jurisdiction may be predicated in light of the requirements of due process in the
United States. 84 Section 5(a) of the Uniform Act contains many of the broad
connecting factors through which personal jurisdiction can be established under
the Restatement. 85 The Restatement is, however, more expansive than the

83.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment c.

84. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 421, at 305-07 states:
(1) A State may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to
a person or thing if the relationship of the State to the person or thing is such as to
make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
(2) In general, a State's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person
or thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted:
(a) the person or thing is present in the territory of the State, other than transitorily;
(b) the person, if a natural person, is domiciled in the State;
(c) the person, if a natural person, is resident in the State;
(d) the person, if a natural person, is a national of the State;
(e) the person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person, is organized pursuant
to the law of the State;
(f) a ship, aircraft or other vehicle to which the adjudication relates is registered under
the laws of the State;
(g) the person, whether natural or juridical, has consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction;
(h) the person, whether natural or juridical, regularly carries on business in the State;
(i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on activity in the State, but
only in respect of such activity;
(j) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside the State an activity
having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the State, but only in
respect of such activity; or
(k) the thing that is the subject of adjudication is owned, possessed, or used in the
State, but only in respect of a claim reasonably connected with that thing.
(3) A defense of lack of jurisdiction is generally waived by any appearance by or on
behalf of a person or thing (whether as plaintiff, defendant, or third party), if the
appearance is for a purpose that does not include a challenge to the exercise of
jurisdiction.
85. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 20, § 5(a), which states:
(a) The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal
jurisdiction if
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign State;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the
proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had agreed to submit
to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign State when the proceedings were
instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business, was
incorporated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the foreign State;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign State and the proceedings in the
foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of business
done by the defendant through that office in the foreign State; or
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Uniform Act in that section 421 also includes provisions for establishing
jurisdiction based upon the presence of property. 86Due to the broad scope of the
personal jurisdiction provisions of the Restatement, it is unlikely that a court in
the United States will refuse to recognize a foreign country money-judgment on
this basis as it will apply 87similarly broad personal jurisdiction contacts as those
used by a foreign forum.
The lack-of-jurisdiction-over-defendant ground, like other mandatory grounds
of nonrecognition, is utilized with caution by U.S. courts. The case law in this
area is exceedingly interesting, but sparse. Much of the limited case law is rather
dated, which demonstrates the increasing hesitancy of U.S. courts when
promoting comity,88 while at the same time facing the mandatory nonrecognition
conditions. Most U.S. courts prefer to rely upon the nonrecognition grounds that
the Restatement and the Uniform Act qualify as discretionary grounds for
nonrecognition.
5. Discretionary Groundsfor Nonrecognition
As mentioned previously, section 482(2) lists six discretionary nonrecognition
grounds. 9 Under this section, a U.S. court is not required to deny recognition,
but may do so in the interest of justice. As with the mandatory grounds for
nonrecognition,
the discretionary conditions can be regarded as "recognition
90
defenses."
a.

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The first discretionary ground for nonrecognition listed in the Restatement is
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 91 For purposes of the Restatement, subject

(6)

the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign State and the
proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of such
operation.
According to UNIFORM AcT, supra note 20, § 5(b), however, courts may recognize other bases of
jurisdiction.
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 421(1), 421(2)(a), (k), at 305-06.
87. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), in which
an Indian court was determined to have contacts with the United States defendant in general compliance
with the requirements of due process in the United States. Notice that in this case a forum non
conveniens analysis seemed to be assimilated within the personal jurisdiction analysis. But see Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972),
where a judgment by the High Court of Zambia was given effect over creditors and shareholders from
the United States, over whom the Zambian court did not have personal jurisdiction.
88. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984), in which the court described comity as that which "serves our international system like the
mortar which cements together a brick house." For a thoughtful analysis of Laker Airways, see
Rogers, Still Running Against the Wind: A Comment on Antitrust Jurisdictionand Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 931 (1985).
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(a)-(f). For the text of § 482(2)(a)-(f), see supra note 24.
90. See Note, supra note 35, at 186.
91.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(a).
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matter jurisdiction is normally presumed.92 Consequently, under the Restatement,
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is of little practical importance. Conceptually,
lack of subject matter jurisdiction retains more significance under the Uniform Act
because it treats the lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a mandatory ground for
nonrecognition. 93 If lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a discretionary factor for
nonrecognition, as under the Restatement, then subject matter jurisdiction is
viewed primarily as a matter of internal organization within the purviews of the
rendering court. The recognizing court should closely scrutinize the rendering
court's subject matter jurisdiction in cases in which the foreign judgment sought
to be enforced in the United States affects land in the United States, or patents,
94
trademarks, copyrights, and equally important intellectual property rights.
b.

Insufficient Time to Defend
Another discretionary ground for nonrecognition in section 482 of the Restatement is that the defendant did not receive notice of the action in sufficient time
to prepare a defense. 95 Because a total lack of adequate notice would prevent
personal jurisdiction, 96 section 482(2)(b) of the Restatement, being a discretionary provision, must mean that the defendant received adequate notice, but that the
notice was untimely. Receiving late notice implies that the defendant could not
reach the court in time to defend. In many respects, section 482(2)(b) of the
Restatement reflects due process requirements in the United States and is closely
associated with the question of personal jurisdiction, the lack of which is a
mandatory ground for nonrecognition under section 482(1)(b) of the Restatement.
Case law suggests that notice requires not only timeliness but also a certain
degree of informativeness. Insufficient notice exists not only when no notice or
late notice is given, but also when actual notice is given but such notice does not
adequately apprise the defendant: (1) of the nature of the proceeding; (2) of the
time of the proceeding; or (3) of the issues to be litigated. In international
enforcement cases, language often becomes a major issue. At the outset, it
should be clear that notice ought to be in the defendant's language. How much
notice should be in that language becomes the crucial question. Two cases
involving the United States, Israel, and Switzerland illustrate the problem.
Switzerland, Israel, and the United States are all signatory parties to the Hague
Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters of November 15, 1965. 9 7 Under the terms of the Hague

92. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment a and d, at 604-05 and 607, respectively.
93. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 20, § 4(a)(3).
94. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment d.

95. RESrATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(b).
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(l)(b).
97. See Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil

or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Hague Convention].
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Convention to meet the constitutional due process requirements of personal
jurisdiction in the United States the defendant must be informed in the language
of the jurisdiction where he is served that98 a specific legal action is pending
against him at a particular time and place.
Julen v. Larson99 involved a Swiss default judgment in which the defendant,
a U.S. citizen, was served by two mailed letters in California. Neither letter
indicated that the papers were of any legal significance. The documents were in
German, a language the defendant could not understand. Consequently, it may be
argued that under neither the due process standards of the United States
Constitution nor the Hague Convention was the notice adequate to inform him of
the lawsuit or to give him sufficient time to defend. 100 Therefore, the court had
no choice but to deny recognition of the Swiss judgment. 'o The result should be
the same under the Restatement even though section 482(2)(b) focuses heavily
upon the time element rather than the degree of informativeness.
Contrast the preceding case with Tahan v. Hodgson. 102 In Tahan the court
upheld and recognized a default judgment entered against the defendant by an
Israeli court. 10 3 Defendant Hodgson operated a travel agency that had transacted
business in Israel for several years until a dispute arose with the plaintiff's travel
agency. Plaintiff Tahan claimed that Hodgson's agency owed him a sum of money
for past services, but Hodgson denied the debt. The plaintiff's attorney subsequently served Hodgson while Hodgson was in Jerusalem. Hodgson refused service,
and later, a copy of the complaint, on the grounds that they were drawn in Hebrew,
a language he could not read. Plaintiff Tahan later received a default judgment in
Israel, which he sought to have recognized and enforced in the United States.
The court concluded service was effective and sufficient in the initial
proceeding and well within constitutional parameters. 10 4 Not only were the
papers in the language of the state where the defendant was served, but the court
also found that on the basis of Tahan's previous business experience in Israel he
"risked ignoring the papers at his own peril." 105 Most importantly, the court
emphasized that Hodgson admitted to having contacted a lawyer about defending
the charge. 106 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and
recognized the Israeli judgment, which held that the plaintiff had attained proper
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
98. Id. art. 5.
99. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
100. Even if the letter had said in English that the accompanying documents were official court
documents that would fully explain the nature of the proceedings, the notice requirements would not
have been met under Hague Convention, supra note 97, art. 5.
101. Julen, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 800.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Tahan
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

v. Hodgson, 626 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
862-63, 868.
864-65.
865.
863,865.
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c.

Fraud
A rare yet legally interesting discretionary ground upon which a U.S. court
can properly refuse to recognize a foreign country judgment is fraud. '0 7 Both the
corresponding comments 0 8 and case law' 0 9 acknowledge that traditionally only
extrinsic fraud permitted a court in the United States to deny recognition of a
foreign state's judgment. Thus, only if the rendering court precluded the losing
party of an adequate opportunity to present its case could the court in the State
in which recognition was sought, set aside the judgment. 110 In the United States
intrinsic fraud, such as a judgment based on perjured testimony or falsified
documents, normally does not bar the recognition of foreign judgments.
Contrary to the traditional views of the judiciary, the Restatement (Second)
of
12
Judgments rejects the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. 1
Under the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, the question is
subject to discussion. The Restatement makes it perfectly clear that the
appropriate standard of nonrecognition based upon fraud is established by the
recognizing forum, regardless of whether the judgment could be set aside on that
ground in the rendering foreign court. 113 Conversely, if the judgment could be
set aside in the rendering forum, the U.S. court should stay the recognition and
enforcement action in order to provide the judgment debtor an opportunity to
petition the rendering court to set aside the judgment, subject, in appropriate
cases, to the posting of security. 114 For recognition purposes, a challenge based
upon intrinsic fraud should be addressed to the rendering court because that court
is more familiar with the case than the recognizing court. Essentially, this view
allows the determination of fraud to be made by the recognizing forum unless it
is defaulted-default being whether the U.S. court would "permit the issue of
fraud to be settled conclusively upon concepts of fairness and justice at variance
5
with those prevailing in the United States." 1

107. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(c).
108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment e at 607-08.

109. Among the early intrinsic fraud cases are Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, Ltd., 33 F.2d 667
(Ist Cir. 1929); Harges v. Harges, 46 Misc. 2d 994, 261 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1965). For extrinsic
fraud cases, see, e.g., Tamimi v. Tamimi, 38 A.D.2d 197, 328 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1972); Parker v.
Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945).
110. For further details, see Bishop & Burnette, supra note 35, at 434-36; von Mehren &
Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-CountryJudgments in the United States, 6 LAW

& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 59-61 (1974); Note, ForeignNation Judgments:Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Florida and the Status of FloridaJudgments Abroad, 31 U. FLA. L. REV.
588, 618-20 (1979).
111. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment e; see also Reese, supra note 30, at 793-97.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 70 and comment c to § 70 (1968).
113. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment e, at 607; see also von Mehren & Patterson,

supra note 110, at 60.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment e, at 608.
115. See Reese, supra note 30, at 794; see also Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco
(Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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d.

Public Policy
In practice, probably the single most important ground for nonrecognition is
public policy. It is well settled that a court in the United States will not recognize
or enforce a foreign judgment based upon a claim that is perceived as contrary
to fundamental notions of decency and justice. 1 6 The Restatement reflects this
view by treating violations of public policy as a discretionary ground for
nonrecognition. 1 7 On its face, public policy appears to be a catchall provision.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the public policy ground for nonrecognition has been
criticized as the "most elastic and unpredictable." 11 8 To keep it within
reasonable limits, the public policy defense to judgment recognition should be
construed with restraint. Only a cautious utilization of the public policy defense
will help the courts achieve the goal of international comity. Perhaps the wisdom
of Judge Cardozo's famous statement against a parochial use of the public policy
defense as enunciated in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. should be heeded: "...
[Courts should] not close their doors, unless [application of the forum law]
would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." 1 19
The Restatement agrees with this view. Commentf to section 482 states that
the mere fact that a cause of action on which a judgment was based does not exist
or has been abolished in a State where recognition is sought does not necessarily
make recognition and subsequent enforcement contrary to the public policy of
that State or the United States. ' 20 The case law is replete with examples that
illustrate how far American courts are willing to go in this regard.' 21 In Hilton
v. Guyot, for example, the Supreme Court found no offense to public policy in
the French procedures whereby courts admitted hearsay and testimony not under
oath and denied the defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses. 122 Similarly, other courts in the United States have held that public policy is not offended
by rules of evidence that create presumptions at variance with those of the
forum. 123 Recently the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas has made it very clear, however, that lack of reciprocity does not violate
American public policy. 124

116. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 110, at61.
117. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2,§ 482(2)(d).
118. Scoles & Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation Judgments:
California, Oregon, and Washington, 57 OR. L. REV. 377, 384 (1978).
119. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y.99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
120. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment f,at 608.
121. See, e.g., Pentz v. Kuppinger, 31 Cal. App. 3d 590, 107 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1973); Hager v.
Hager, 1111.
App. 3d 1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971); Stein v.Siegel, 50 A.D.2d 916, 377 N.Y.S.2d
580, 582 (1975).
122. Hilton v.Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 204-05 (1895).
123. See Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N.Y.S. 573 (Sup. Ct. 1908), modified, 134 App.
Div. 325, 119 N.Y.S. 3 (1909), modified, 201 N.Y. 599, 95 N.E. 1134 (1911).
124. Hunt v.BP Exploration Co. (Libya), Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 898 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
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The bifurcation of jurisdiction between federal and state courts in the United
States adds complexity to the public policy defense. The Restatement emphasizes that the cause of action upon which the judgment is based and the judgment
itself must not be repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the
state where recognition is sought.' 25 By contrast, the Uniform Act permits the
recognizing court to deny recognition if the judgment is "repugnant to the public
policy of this state."' 26 Thus, the Uniform Act does not make special reference
to the public policy of the United States. The Restatement seems to assume that
there may be situations in which the public policy of the United States may differ
from that of the recognizing state. It is difficult, however, to hypothesize a
situation in which recognition would be offensive to the public policy of the
recognizing state but not to that of the United States. Consequently, the
distinction between the public policy of the recognizing state and the public
policy of the United States should not be overestimated. This distinction is
important, however, in that it underscores that courts in the United States should
not apply local public policy against a foreign judgment lightly.
e.

Inconsistent Judgments
Under section 482(2)(e) of the Restatement a court in the United States need
not recognize a judgment that conflicts with another final judgment that is
entitled to recognition in this country.' 27 While this provision appears to be of
little practical importance, there may be situations where two conflicting foreign
judgments are sought to be enforced in the United States. Theoretically, in such
a situation a court could recognize the earlier judgment, the later judgment, or
neither of them. Particularly difficult questions may arise in cases where a
foreign judgment is in conflict with a judgment rendered by a U.S. court. In such
a situation, the U.S. court may be inclined to recognize the sister-state judgment
rather than the inconsistent foreign judgment, whether or not the sister-state
judgment was rendered first in time.
Section 482(2)(e) of the Restatement is silent on the issue of which of two
conflicting judgments should receive preference. Comment g to section 482
states that courts are "likely" to recognize the later of two inconsistent foreign
judgments, presumably on the theory that the later judgment has considered the
effects of the previous one. The comment acknowledges, however, that under
section 482(2)(e) of the Restatement the court may recognize the earlier
judgment or neither of them.' 28 As to the conflict between a foreign country
judgment and a prior sister-state judgment, comment g to section 482 of the
125. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(d).

126. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 20, § 4(b)(3).
127. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(e).

128. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment g, at 608; see also Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d
493, 506 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 202 Misc.
470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641, 648 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
VOL. 24, NO. I

FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY-JUDGMENTS

43

Restatement confines itself to the statement that there is "no principle requiring
automatic preference for the sister-state judgment." In sum, the rather noncommittal comment to section 482(2)(e) of the Restatement leaves the determination
to the recognizing court. The ultimate determination as to which of two
inconsistent judgments is to be recognized should be achieved by balancing the
equities involved in a particular case. 129 As a result, a judicial decision in this
type of case is highly fact sensitive.
f. Judgment Inconsistent with Parties'
Contractual Choice of Forum
The sixth and final discretionary nonrecognition factor in section 482 of the
Restatement applies when parties to a contract select an exclusive forum for any
dispute that may arise between them, and one party receives a judgment from a
forum other than the one agreed to by the parties.' 30 In such a situation, a court
in the United States need not recognize the judgment rendered by the not-agreedto forum.131 Section 482(2)(f) of the Restatement reflects the modem trend to
give effect to forum selection agreements,' 32 at least in respect of international
commercial and business transactions. 133 Of course, the forum selection clause
may be waived expressly or by implication,' 34 and if waiver is found by the
rendering court, the finding is typically binding on the recognizing court. 35 In
practice, section 482(2)(f) of the Restatement will ordinarily apply to foreign
default judgments, since appearance of the judgment debtor before, and
participation of the judgment debtor in an action in a forum other than the forum
previously agreed upon by the parties effectively waives the contractual choice
36
of forum. 1
B.

ENFORCEMENT

Under section 481(2) of the Restatement, recognition is a necessary prerequisite for enforcement. Even though a foreign judgment may be entitled to
recognition under section 481 (1) of the Restatement, however, enforcement will
not necessarily follow. Recognition and enforcement can be analogized to a
favorite American pastime, that of baseball. Recognition could be compared to
reaching first base. Enforcement, in turn, would be similar to reaching home,
and scoring a run that wins the game for the team in the bottom of the ninth
129. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 110, at 71-72; Note, supra note 35, at 186.
130. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(f).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
133. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 reporter's note 5 at 610-11.
134. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482 comment h.

135. Id.
136. Id.
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inning. In other words, recognition, although essential, is in reality nothing more
than the first step in a two-step procedural process.
Whether or not a foreign judgment entitled to recognition in the United States
will be enforced is determined ultimately by the law of the jurisdiction where
enforcement is sought. Each of the fifty states has its own law governing the
procedure for enforcement of judgments.' 37 Given the differences in the law and
practice of the fifty states, it is understandable that neither the comments nor the
reporters' notes following sections 481 and 482 of the Restatement attempts to
comment upon state enforcement procedures and their applicability to foreign
money-judgments. Generally foreign judgments are not directly enforceable in
the United States; instead, they need to be reduced to a judgment of the enforcing
court. This procedure makes them enforceable under local law. 138
Statutory provisions that simplify the enforcement procedure and act as a
surrogate by merging the judgment and the original claim are found under the
Uniform Enforcement Acts. 139 By the end of 1988, a majority of the states in the
United States had adopted the Uniform Enforcement Act of 1964.140 In other
words, far more states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement Act than the
Uniform Recognition Act. 141 The typical, simplified, summary
judgment-type
42
procedure under the Uniform Enforcement Act is as follows: 1
(1) A judgment that is properly authenticated under federal or state statutes
should be filed in the district clerk's office.
(2) A notice of the filing should be sent to the judgment debtor, with the
name and address of the judgment creditor and his attorney.
(3) Along with the filing of judgment should be a proof of mailing of the
notice, an affidavit showing the name and last known address of both the
judgment debtor and creditor, and a sworn translation (if the judgment is
written in a foreign language).
(4) The clerk is required to mail a notice of the filing to the debtor and to treat
the foreign judgment in the same manner as a domestic judgment.
If these provisions are complied with, the foreign country judgment is enforceable as if it were rendered by a court in the United States. The judgment creditor
137. Federal courts generally follow the enforcement procedures of the state in which the federal
court sits. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 110, at 72 n. 194.
138. See id. at 72.
139. See UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT OF 1948, 13 U.L.A. 181 (1986), and UNIF.
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT OF 1964, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986) (revision of 1948 Act).
140. Jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Enforcement Act of 1964 include Alabama,

Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See 13 U.L.A. at 4 (Supp. 1989). Jurisdictions that
have adopted the Uniform Enforcement Act of 1948 include Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, and
Nebraska. See 13 U.L.A. at 12 (Supp. 1989).
141. For a list of states that have adopted the Uniform Recognition Act, see supra note 21.
142. See, e.g., Bishop, ObtainingRecognition and Enforcement ofForeign CountryJudgments in
Texas, 45 TEx. B.J. 287, 287-88 (1982).
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retains the option of bringing a suit to enforce the judgment, and the judgment
debtor may still43initiate a proceeding to reopen, vacate, or stay the execution of
the judgment.
H. Foreign Arbitral Awards and Agreements to Arbitrate
Thus far, attention has focused upon legal issues in connection with the
recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments. Similarly complex and
complicated questions arise in cases in which recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards or agreements to arbitrate are sought in the United States.
International commercial arbitration has become the preeminent mechanism for
resolving international commercial disputes, and it is likely to remain an
important dispute resolution device in virtually all countries involved in
international trade. 44 In the landmark case of MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 4 5 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its belief
in the efficacy of arbitral proceedings in international commercial disputes by
upholding the arbitrability of antitrust claims arising from an international
contract.
A.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law takes into account the
overwhelming practical importance of international commercial arbitration and
the need for the smooth functioning of the recognition and enforcement of
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.
1. The Restatement and the New York Convention
Sections 487146 and 488147 of the Restatement cover the recognition and

143. Id. at 289.
144. See Ebke, Book Review, 22 INT'L LAW. 1258 (1988) (reviewing M. ADEN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1988)).
145. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). For a thorough
discussion of this case, see Comment, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration AgreementsPost-Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U.L. REv. 57 (1986).
146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487:
Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, and subject only to the defenses set forth in § 488,
(1) a court in a State party to the Convention must recognize and enforce an
arbitral award, rendered in a State party to the Convention pursuant to a valid
written agreement to arbitrate, at least if the legal relationship that gave rise to the
controversy was commercial in character;
(2) a court in a State party to the Convention must, at the request of any party to
an action, stay or dismiss the action pending arbitration if an agreement to arbitrate
falling under the Convention is in effect and covers the controversy on which the action
is based.
147. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488:
Under the convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards,
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enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards in some detail. These
two provisions are based upon the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly referred to as the New
York Convention, 148 and the United States Arbitration Act, which implements the
Convention. 149 The New York Convention, which despite its official title applies
to both arbitral awards and agreements to arbitrate, became effective in 1959 and
entered into force in the United States on December 29, 1970.150 Seventy-six
countries are presently parties to the New York Convention; these countries
5
include developed and lesser developed nations, as well as socialist countries.' 1
a.

Scope
The fact that Sections 487 and 488 of the Restatement are based upon the New
York Convention determines their scope: sections 487 and 488 cover only arbitral
awards and agreements to arbitrate arising out of legal relationships that are
"commercial" in nature. 152 Consequently, arbitration agreements and awards
arising out of matrimonial or custody disputes are excluded. 15 3 Arbitration in

(1) a court in a State party to the Convention may deny recognition or
enforcement to a foreign arbitral award if
(a) the agreement to arbitrate was not valid under the applicable law;
(b) the party against which the award was rendered did not receive proper
notice of the proceedings or was otherwise not afforded an
opportunity to present its case;
(c) the award deals with matters outside the terms of the agreement to
arbitrate;
(d) the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was
contrary to the agreement of the parties or to the law of the State
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been suspended
or set aside by a competent court in the State where it was made.
(2) A court of a State party to the Convention may also deny recognition or
enforcement to a foreign arbitral award that meets the requirements of § 487 if,
under the law of that State,
(a) the subject matter of the controversy is not capable of settlement by arbitration; or
(b) recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy.
148. New York Convention, supra note 20.
149. See United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. (1982) [hereinafter U.S. Arbitration Act].
150. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Pub. L.
No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970). For details of the New York Convention and the implementing
legislation, see Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States
Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. I (1971); McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735 (1971); Quigley, Convention
on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A. J. 821 (1972); Comment, United Nations Foreign Arbitral
Awards Convention: United States Accession, 2 CAL. W. Iwr'L L.J. 67 (1971).
151. For a listing of countries now parties to the Convention, see 9 U.S.C.A. § 201, at 197 (West
Supp. 1989).
152. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment f.

153. See also U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § I (1982).
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accordance with the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, on the other hand, is in general
subject to the rules set forth in sections 487 and 488 of the Restatement.154
Similarly, an arbitration agreement arising out of a maritime contract would also
155
seem to be subject to the rules in sections 487 and 488 of the Restatement.
b.

Reciprocity
The United States, like a majority of the other States party to the Convention,
adheres to the Convention subject to reciprocity. 156 The critical elements,
therefore, for the United States and the other countries requiring reciprocity is the
place of the award. Under section 487(1) of the Restatement the place of the
arbitral award determines the applicability of the Convention. In the same
manner, under section 487(e) of the Restatement the agreed place of arbitration
determines the applicability of the Convention. 157 Arbitration agreements
between citizens of the United States generally do not fall under the New York
Convention unless the legal relationship out of which the arbitration agreement
arises involves property located outside the United States, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or
more foreign countries. 1 58 For purposes of section 487(2) of the Restatement,
like the United States Arbitration Act, a corporation is a citizen of the United
States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United
States. 159
2. Federal Courts versus State Courts
The Convention and the implementing United States legislation aim at
encouraging arbitration of disputes arising out of transactions by American

154. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 reporters' note 5 at 487-88. For further details, see
Symposium, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments and Arbitral Awards:
A North-South Perspective, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 635, 651-53 (1981).
155. Cf. Atlas Chartering Servs., Inc. v. World Trade Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (enforceability of arbitration agreement in maritime contract between two foreign corporations
is governed by the United States Arbitration Act, supra note 149, which implements the New York
Convention).
156. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment b. Thus, in the case of Iran, American
courts cannot give effect to a clause in a contract between an American and an Iranian providing for
arbitration in Iran, as Iran is not a signatory to the New York Convention. See National Iranian Oil
Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F. 2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 823 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). By contrast, requisite reciprocity between the United States and
India was present to permit recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in India. See
Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981),
reconsiderationdenied, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
157. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 reporters' note 2, at 633.
158. See U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982); see also van den Berg, When Is an Arbitral
Award Nondomestic under the New York Convention of 1958?, 6 PACE
L. REV. 25 (1985).
159. See U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
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business in foreign countries.' 6° As a result of the Convention and the
implementing legislation, enforcement in the United States of foreign arbitral
awards and agreements to arbitrate is a question of international obligation and
federal law. 161 Consequently, the federal courts in the United States typically
hear motions to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award or an arbitration
agreement. 162 Actions brought in state courts to enforce or set aside a foreign
arbitral award, or to proceed notwithstanding such an award, or an agreement to
arbitrate falling under the New York Convention may be removed to federal
court at any time before trial, whether or not the applicability of the Convention
appears on the face of the complaint. 163 Actions to enforce foreign arbitral
awards or arbitration agreements not falling under the Convention, by contrast,
must be brought in state courts, unless a diversity of citizenship creates federal
court jurisdiction. 164 Case law in the United States concerning the New York
Convention is comparatively sparse. This is due in part to the fact that the United
States became a party to the Convention only a few years ago, and in part to the
fact that most arbitral awards are complied with voluntarily.
3. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN Treaties)
1 65
Many of the United States treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation
contain provisions concerning the recognition and enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate and of arbitral awards. 166 Generally, the FCN treaty provisions are

160. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
161. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment a, at 629-30.
162. See R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOGLE, supra note 14, at 375.

163. See U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982). As to the timeliness of the motion, see
Dale Metals Corp. v. Kiwa Chem. Indus. Co., 442 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
164. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 reporters' note 8, at 636-67. The law and practice of
the fifty states concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards and
agreements to arbitrate vary widely. Id. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent to the Uniform Foreign
Country Money-Judgments Act, supra note 20, with respect to arbitral awards or arbitration
agreements. See RESTATEMENr, supra note 2, § 487 reporters' note 8, at 636-37.
165. On these treaties, see generally R.R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); Hynning, Treaty Law for the Private Practitioner, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 36

(1955); Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805
(1958); Wilson, A Decade of New Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 927 (1956).
166. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United
States-Federal Republic of Germany, art. VI, § 2, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593: *
2. Contracts entered into between nationals or companies of either Party and
nationals or companies of the other Party, that provide for the settlement by arbitration
of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable within the territories of such other
Party merely on the grounds that the place designated for the arbitration proceedings
is outside such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not
that of such other Party. Awards duly rendered pursuant to any such contracts, which
are final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed
conclusive in enforcement proceedings brought before the courts of competent jurisVOL. 24, NO. I
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consistent with the New York Convention.' 67 The pertinent provisions of some
of these treaties, however, amount to little more than declarations of
nondiscrimination. 168 If both the New York Convention and an FCN treaty apply
to a particular agreement to arbitrate or to a particular arbitral award, the
Convention and the implementing U.S. legislation, rather than the FCN Treaty,
will apply,
will govern. 169 If no FCN Treaty exists, the New York Convention
70
provided, of course, the conditions of the Convention are met.'
4. Cases Not Falling under the Convention or An FNC Treaty
In the United States the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate or of an
nor an FCN treaty is subject
arbitral award falling under neither the17Convention
1
to the general principles of U.S. law.
a.

General Principles
As the drafters of the Restatement correctly observed, arbitral awards and
arbitration agreements are generally enforceable in the United States in the same
manner as foreign judgments (sections 481 and 482 of the Restatement) whether
or not judicially confirmed in the rendering state. 172 As a result, such awards and
arbitration agreements may be subject to rules of nonrecognition slightly
different ffom those applicable to awards and agreements to arbitrate falling
under the New York Convention or an FCN treaty. For example, arbitral awards
falling under the Convention must be recognized and enforced even if rendered
to recognize or enforce foreign
after default,' 73 whereas many states decline
74
1
default.
after
rendered
judgments
country

diction of either Party, and shall be entitled to be declared enforceable by such courts,
except where found contrary to public policy. When so declared, such awards shall be
entitled to privileges and measures of enforcement appertaining to awards rendered
locally. It is understood, however, that awards rendered outside the United States of
America shall be entitled in any court in any State thereof only to the same measure
of recognition as awards rendered in other states thereof.
167. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment a, at 630.
168. See Note, supra note 161, at 655.
169. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment a, at 629-30.
170. The New York Convention, supra note 20, does not apply to enforcement of judgments that
confirm foreign arbitration awards. See Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d
709, 713 (2d Cir. 1987). The Convention does not bar attachment pending arbitration. See Carolina
Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see also McCreary Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.P.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974).
171. If an FCN treaty exists between the United States and a country which is not a party to the
New York Convention, the treaty provisions concerning recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards and of agreements to arbitrate will ordinarily take precedence over domestic principles of the
law of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards or agreements to arbitrate. But see von
Mehren & Patterson, supra note 110, at 77.
172. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comments c & h, at 630-31 & 633.
173. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 487 comment c, at 630-31.
174. See supra notes 55-57 & accompanying text.
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b.

Public Policy
Gradual differences as to the public policy defense also arise. As a general
rule, the public policy limitation under the New York Convention is construed
narrowly by courts in the United States. 175 In general, it is applied only where
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award or arbitration agreement
would violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice. 176
One federal court held that failure to disclose an arbitrator's relationship with a
party to the arbitration agreement did not taint arbitral proceedings in India such
that recognition or enforcement of the arbitral award in the United States under
the Convention was contrary to public policy. 177 By contrast, arbitration
agreements exacted by duress may furnish a basis for refusing recognition or
enforcement of an arbitral award falling within the ambit of the New York
Convention. 178 Reporters' Note 2 to section 488 of the Restatement references
cases that narrowly construe the public policy defense under the New York
Convention and seems to suggest that the Restatement coincides with these
limitations. 179 Consequently, although the public policy defense available in
enforcement of foreign judgment cases is used cautiously by U.S. courts,' 80 the
defense may be even more limited under the Convention and the rules set forth
in section 488(2)(b).
B.

DEFENSES

Apart from the public policy defense, section 488 of the Restatement lists
numerous other defenses to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards rendered outside the United States. As the
language used in section 488 of the Restatement ("may deny recognition")
indicates, all of the defenses set forth in this provision, including the public
policy defense, are discretionary. The list, however, is exclusive.'81
1. Section 488(1) of the Restatement
Section 488(1) of the Restatement lists five grounds on which a court in a
country party to the New York Convention may deny recognition or enforcement
175. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socie6t G6n6rale de l'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
176. See, e.g., Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); LaminoirsTrefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
177. See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981),
reconsideration denied, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
178. See Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 480 F. Supp. 352
(S.D.N.Y.

1979).

179. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488 reporters' note 2.
180. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(d); see also supra notes 116-26 & accompanying
text.
181. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488 comment a.
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to a foreign arbitral award. 182 The first paragraph of section 488 allows a court
a
in a state party to the Convention to deny recognition and enforcement to 83
1
foreign arbitral award if the agreement was not valid under the applicable law.
The court may also deny recognition or enforcement if the party against whom
the award was rendered did not receive proper notice of the proceedings or was
otherwise not afforded an opportunity to present its case.18 4 This defense
includes elements of notice and fraud that under section 482(2)(b)-(c) of the
Restatement are also discretionary grounds for nonrecognition of foreign
judgments. 185 In addition, an award need not be recognized if it deals with
matters outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. 186
Additionally, a court need not recognize or enforce an arbitration award if the
"constitution" of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was contrary to
the agreement of the parties or the law of the country where the arbitration took
place. 187 This defense is similar to the "lack of fair procedures" defense under
section 482(l)(a) of the Restatement, which, if established, is a mandatory
ground for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment.1 88 Finally, a court need not
recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award if the award is not yet binding on
the parties or has been suspended or set aside by a competent court in the
rendering state. 189
The reporters of the Restatement acknowledge that many of the grounds for
nonrecognition stated above are expressly provided for in the New York
Convention.' 9" Yet, they consider it "clear" that "if a purported agreement to
arbitrate is not valid under the applicable law . . ., or does not cover the
controversy between the parties . . ., a court in a contracting State may not order
19
the parties to arbitrate or stay an action pending arbitration."' ' Similarly, the
drafters of the Restatement are of the opinion that, "by analogy to [section
488(2)(a) of the Restatement]," a court is not required to recognize or enforce a
foreign arbitral award if the subject matter of the controversy is not capable of
192
settlement by arbitration according to the law of the state where the court sits.
While there is indeed much in favor of the grounds for nonrecognition listed in
section 488(1) of the Restatement, one should not forget that section 488 of the
182. See supra note 147.
183. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488(1)(a). For a case illustrating this defense, see, e.g.,
In re Ferrara S.PA., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (concerning an Italian rule of law providing
that arbitration agreements are unenforceable unless they appear above signatures of both parties).
184. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488(l)(b).
185. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 482(2)(b)-(c). For details, see supra notes 95-115 &

accompanying text.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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See
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488 comment c.

192. Id.
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Restatement does not purport to restate the law under the New York Convention.
Instead, section 488(1) of the Restatement seems to provide a fair and succinct
restatement of the rules of law developed by the courts in the United States
applying the New York Convention. The grounds for nonrecognition set forth in
section 488(1) of the Restatement do, however, contribute to the movement
towards more uniformity with respect to the law of recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards at the state level in the United States, as there is no equivalent
93
to the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act.1
2. Section 488(2) of the Restatement
Section 488(2) of the Restatement lists two additional discretionary defenses
to recognition and enforcement to a foreign arbitral award: the public policy
defense' 94 and the defense based upon the fact that the matter is not capable of
arbitration. 195 Both defenses are of utmost importance in practice. Many of the
cases that have arisen in the U.S. courts under the New York Convention, as well
as apart from it, have dealt with one or both of these defenses. As previously
stated, U.S. courts applying the New York Convention public policy limitation
tend to construe the defense narrowly and cautiously. 196 Given the fact that the
New York Convention is applicable on its face only to agreements and awards of
a commercial character,' 9 7 the "lack of arbitrability" defense is also naturally
limited to disputes arising out of commercial contracts, which are normally
arbitrable. This is the case under the laws of most major states, including France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. 198 Difficult questions may arise,
however, in connection with the arbitrability of public laws not subject to the
disposition of private parties, which with increasing frequency affect international business transactions. 199
Although, historically, international arbitration agreements were looked upon
with disdain, the current trend is towards a more generous acceptance of
arbitration, both nationally and internationally. 200 In the past some courts have
viewed international arbitration agreements and awards as an attempt to strip
courts of their judicial authority. This view was put to rest, however, in the

193. See supra note 164.
194. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488(2)(a). For details of the public policy defense, see

supra notes 175-79 & accompanying text.
195. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 4 88( 2 )(a).
196. See supra notes 175-77 & accompanying text.
197. See supra note 152.
198. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 488 reporters' note 1.
199. For a thought-provoking analysis of the question of whether article VIII, section 2(b) of the
International Monetary Fund Agreement is arbitrable, see Sandrock, Are Disputes Over the
Application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF Treaty Arbitrable?, 23 INT'L LAW. 933 (1989); see
also W. EBKE, INTERNATIONALES DEVISENRECHT ch. 1 (1989).
200. See Comment, supra note 145, at 57-66.
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famous case of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 20 when the United States
Supreme Court stated: "[T]he argument that such clauses are improper because
they tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal
fiction." 20 2 In the same case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the changing of
times and dependence on what is becoming an ever increasing international
economy by stating that the judicial encroachment theory has "little place in an
era when all courts are overloaded
and when businesses once essentially local
' 20 3
now operate in world markets.
The acceptance of both the need and practicality of international arbitration
agreements was again pushed to new heights in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 204 where the Supreme Court upheld the arbitration of
an antitrust claim and again emphasized the need for international comity. 20 5 The
extent to which parties' choice of law or choice of forum agreements will be
permitted is still the subject of considerable debate. The uncertainty is inevitable
because, in an international arena there are conflicting and competing policy
concerns: on the one side are the individuals' right and freedom to contract and
the desire to ascertain predictability and certainty in the outcome of business
dealings; on the other is the justification and protection of important domestic
policies, such as consumer and investor protection through, for example, security
regulation and antitrust laws. The fact that an arbitral award can be formulated and
eventually binding without any reasons having to be uncommunicated by the
arbitrator complicates the balancing of competing interests and the question of the
arbitrability of an issue. It is not only understandable but also laudable that the
drafters of the Restatement did not attempt to go into all of the issues associated
with modern international arbitration agreements and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, as any generalization in this area tends to do more
harm than good.
III. Final Thoughts
The preceding discussion has illustrated some of the complex and complicated
issues that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States faced in their attempt to provide a succinct restatement of the
law of recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments and arbitral
awards. The task regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign country
money-judgments was particularly difficult as there is essentially no federal law
on the subject. For the most part, the drafters of the new Restatement have
codified rather than changed the common and statutory law as applied by courts
201. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

202. Id. at 12.
203. Id.; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974).
204. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
205. Id. at 614, 629; see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20.
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in the United States. Where the Restatement deviates from the law (including the
Uniform Law), as it does, for example, with respect to the nonrecognition of
foreign judgments for want of subject matter jurisdiction, the suggested changes
do not create a fundamentally different recognition and enforcement practice.
Where the Restatement has failed to make definite statements of the current state
of the law, as is the case with the doctrine of forum non conveniens in recognition
and enforcement proceedings, possible solutions lurk between the lines of the
Comments and Reporters' Notes.
The approach of the drafters of the Restatement was to restate carefully and
conservatively, as opposed to change fundamentally, the current state of the law
of recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments in the United
States. While this approach is laudable, it can hardly be denied that there is a
great deal of unpredictability and uncertainty in this area of the law, which
obviously results from the lack of multilateral and bilateral treaties and federal
statutes that preempt pertinent state law. Given the lack of uniformity, a
conventional approach such as the one adopted by the new Restatement is
preferable because it may have constructive effects on the judicial development
of the law in this area. Moreover, Restatement provisions that reflect consensus
are more likely to be utilized as part of executive or legislative action towards a
federalization of the relevant law than are novel and innovative provisions that
lack substantial judicial and/or scholarly support.
In any event, the Restatement provisions concerning the recognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments and foreign arbitral awards will no
doubt help courts in the United States accomplish substantial justice in a world
that is increasingly linked legally, economically, socially, and politically.
Construed reasonably and applied prudently, the Restatement provisions discussed in this article will enhance the reputation of the United States as one of
the countries receptive not only to foreign arbitral awards, but also to foreign
judgments. Most importantly, the provisions may eventually lay the ground for
a legally sound, economically efficient, socially desirable, and politically
acceptable universally uniform system of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and arbitral awards. Countries that share similar values with the
United States, as well as countries that have different values, may be willing to
adhere to the Restatement for the sake of the smooth functioning of international
relations.
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